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Interests Between Copyright Users and Owners?
By Dilan Thampapillai
I. Introduction
All of the common law statutes on copyright law have their genesis in the Statute of Anne 
1710 of the United Kingdom.1 The Statute of Anne was the culmination of the lobbying 
1
 See further J. Cohen, L. Loren, R. Okediji and M. O’Rourke, Copyright in a Global Information 
Economy, Aspen Law & Business Publishers, New York, 2002 at pp26-27. See also P. Goldstein, 
Copyright’s Highway, Stanford Law and Politics, Stanford, revised edition 2003 at pp34-35 and pp39-40.
of the Stationer’s Company of London, a publishers guild, to have their economic 
interests in the publishing of manuscripts recognized by the UK parliament. The Statute 
of Anne also advanced the public interest by promoting a greater public access to books 
by creating limited economic rights in literary works. The title of the Statute of Anne
stated that it was to be, “an Act for the encouragement of learning.”2 Furthermore the 
statute granted a limited duration of rights whereas those rights had previously been 
granted in perpetuity.3 Thus from the beginning of the first real statute on copyright the 
common law has had a tradition of balancing the interests between the users and owners
of copyright. At the heart of this balancing act is a utilitarian concern with extracting the 
maximum social and economic benefit from the use of intellectual materials.
This balancing act has encountered difficulties during the digital era. The information 
industries have lobbied hard for changes to copyright laws that will best protect their 
interests. In an almost perfect example of public choice theory, those with the most at 
stake, the owners of copyright materials, have used their strength to push for such laws 
whilst the general public has been insufficiently mobilized to ensure that their interests in 
the intellectual commons are not overlooked.4
This essay examines how common law jurisdictions of Australia and the United States 
have reacted to the digital era. In particular, fair use, fair dealing and digital rights 
management as seen in the context of the balance of interests between the users and 
owners of copyright. 
Australia and the United States
Australia and the United States are suitable subjects for a comparative analysis. Both 
nations belong to the same Western legal tradition, both nations are liberal-conservative 
societies and both are more or less capitalist nations. Furthermore both nations are now 
2
 Ibid. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c.19 (1710). 
3
 Ibid. The statute granted two 14-year terms.
4
 See for example J. Ginsburg, “How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself”, 26 Columbia Journal of Law 
& Arts 61 (2002).
engaged in the process of negotiating a free trade agreement, of which copyright is a 
central part. Both nations have recognized that digital technology poses a significant 
challenge to the enforcement and protection of copyrights.5
Traditionally the United States was a copyright pirate.6 The United States justified its 
behavior on the grounds that it was a net importer of intellectual property and that it 
needed the inflow of ideas in order to develop. The Europeans tried repeatedly to get the 
United States to be a signatory to the Berne Convention, the main copyright treaty. The 
United States has only recently become a defender of copyright in the international 
sphere. It is worth noting that many of the current developing nations have used 
arguments similar to those of the United States to justify lesser standards for intellectual 
property agreements when negotiating at the Stockholm conference and during the 
TRIPS Agreement.7
Australia inherited its copyright laws, along with much of its other laws, from the United 
Kingdom when it became a nation upon federation in 1901.8 Indeed until the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth) entered into force, Australia even still maintained an old copyright statute 
from the United Kingdom which had been repealed in the latter nation many years 
previously.9 Australia is a net importer of intellectual property.10 However copyright 
based industries are important to Australia’s economy. It is a widely held view by both 
5
 See further for the United States, Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (The White Paper), September 1995. See 
also for Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Intellectual Property – A vital asset for 
Australia, November 1999. 
6 See generally Barbara Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright--Past, Present, and 
Future, 56 Georgetown Law Journal 1050 (1968). See further J. Cohen, L. Loren, R. Okediji and M. 
O’Rourke, Copyright in a Global Information Economy, Aspen Law & Business Publishers, New York, 
2002. See also P. Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway, Stanford Law and Politics, Stanford, revised edition 
2003. See also R. Okediji, “Copyright and Public Welfare in a Global Perspective,” 7 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 117 (1999).
7
 Ibid. See also Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development Policy, London, September 2002.
8
 See further J. McKeough, K. Bowery & P.Griffith, Intellectual Property: Commentary and Materials, 
Law Book Co., Sydney 2002. See also R.Reynolds & N. Stoianoff, Intellectual Property: Text and 
Essential Cases, Federation Press, Sydney, 2003.
9 R.Reynolds & N. Stoianoff, Intellectual Property: Text and Essential Cases, Federation Press, Sydney, 
2003 at pp15-16. In the United Kingdom the Copyright Act 1958 repealed the earlier Copyright Act 1911.
10 The Allen Consulting Group, “The Economic Contribution of Australia’s Copyright Industries,” 
Australian Copyright Council Discussion Paper, 2001.
sides of Australian politics that intellectual property symbolizes the key to maintaining 
and increasing Australia’s wealth in the future.11
Australia and the United States successfully concluded negotiations on a free trade 
agreement in May 2004.12 In the absence of a genuine international consensus on trade 
issues, including intellectual property, free trade agreements have become a de facto way 
of safeguarding national interest with trading partners. Whilst it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to explore the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement in detail it is 
worth noting that the fact that copyright laws was a significant issue in the negotiations 
demonstrates the degree to which intellectual property is important to both nations.13 In 
October 2004 Australia implemented its obligations under the Australia-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) when the Commonwealth Parliament passed the US 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (the USFTAI Act). 
The concept of copyright
The balance of interests approach that has prevailed in common law copyright derives 
from a trade-off between the rights of authors and the greater public good. The 
intellectual foundations for this approach are evident in the writings of John Locke in 
Two Treatises on Government:
Man has a Property in his own Person. … The Labour of his Body, and the Works of his Hands, … are 
properly his. Whatsoever he then removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, … he hath mixed his 
Labour with, …and thereby makes it his Property. …It hath by his labour something annexed to it, that 
excludes the common right of other Men. …no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, 
at least where there is enough, and as good as left in common for others.14
11
 Ibid. See also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Intellectual Property – A vital asset for 
Australia, November 1999. 
12For the text of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement please see the website of Australia's 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us.html. See further 
for comments regarding the negotiations and related issues; M. Vaile, “Trade: Multilateral and Bilateral,” 
Sydney Papers, Spring 2002. See also J. Kunkel, “Free Trade Hypocrisy in America and Europe,” Sydney 
Papers, Spring 2002. See also Australian Financial Review, “Free Trade Has Its Price,” Tuesday, May 27, 
2003. Australian Financial Review, “Even if its Not Free US Trade Deal will have some Benefits,” 
Saturday, May 31, 2003.
13
 Ibid.
14
 J. Locke, Two Treatises on Government, (1690) 13.
There is a natural rights theory that exists in the common law but it is constrained by 
notions of moral duty and the common good. That is, Locke’s actor deserves the fruits of 
his labor but it is derived from the physical commons and he has a duty to share any 
surplus with others.15 This translates well into the concept of copyright and in particular 
the concept of the intellectual commons.
There is also sound economic justification for granting quasi-property rights to 
intellectual property. In general intellectual goods are social goods and are non-
excludable.16 It is not possible for an owner of copyright to determine at all times who 
has access to his or her work. Unlike real property, intellectual property cannot be 
protected by a fence or other types of physical barriers. This reality is more profound in 
cyberspace given the ease with which information can be copied and distributed. Indeed 
this is what has given rise to the demand for more digital rights management tools.
In a competitive market a good is available at the marginal cost of its production. With 
regards to copyright works that would mean the cost of copying and distribution. 
However this would not reflect the real cost of production in the form of effort expended 
creating the work in the first place. Copyright law recognizes this dilemma and by 
granting temporary monopoly rights to the owners of creative work it seeks to provide 
adequate incentive for creators to invest their time and energy in making original works. 
Copyright in the Digital Era
Copyright law is presently in a heightened period of change. One of the main reasons 
why this is occurring is because copyright based industries are increasingly important in 
the world economy. In 1999 copyright based industries contributed $460 billion to the 
15
 See further W. Gordon, “A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property,” 102 Yale Law Journal 1533 (1993).
16
 See further for an economic analysis of intellectual property, R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd
edition, 1977. See also W. Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,” 82 Columbia Law Review 1600 (1982).
economy of the United States, including $80 billion in exports.17 In 1999-2000 the 
copyright industries of Australia contributed $19 billion to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).18 There is a lot at stake economically for both Governments and industries in the 
effective protection of copyright. As UNESCO stated:
The creation and ownership of knowledge products are of increasing importance because of the centrality 
of information and knowledge to post-industrial economies. The concept of copyright, originally intended 
to protect authors and publishers of books, has broadened to include other knowledge products such as 
computer programs and films … Copyright has emerged as one of the most important means of regulating 
the international flow of ideas and knowledge based products, and will be a central instrument for the 
knowledge industries of the twenty-first century. Those who control copyright have a significant advantage 
in the emerging, knowledge-based global economy.19
However the digital era has posed new challenges to copyright law. The ability to make 
vast amounts of near-perfect copies and to distribute them with ease, has meant that 
digital technology has challenged the effectiveness of copyright laws. Technology has 
always acted as a spur for change in copyright law.20 The rapid advances in technology 
and the emergence of the internet have been the driving forces of these changes to date.
The internet has been remarkable in its capacity to remove boundaries between people 
and nations. But it has also been described as a “global copying machine, with millions of 
irresponsible and anonymous pirates pushing the buttons.”21 As the Napster22 case 
illustrates the potential for users to acquire perfect copies of copyright-protected material 
on the internet for little or no cost is a genuine threat to the owners of copyright. 
The International Environment
The Berne Convention set the general international standards for copyright law for over 
one hundred years.23 However with the continued advance of the digital era it became 
17
 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy, London, September 2002. 
18
 Ibid note 9.
19
 UNESCO (1998), World Information Report 1997/98, UNESCO, Paris at p320.
20
 Ibid note 1.
21 P. Hugenholtz, “Software as a Commodity: International Licensing of Intellectual Property: 
Commentary: Copyright, Contract, and Code: What Will Remain of the Public Domain?” 26 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 77, 78 (2000) at p83.
22 A & M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Circuit 2001).
23 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 223 U.N.T.S. 11850.
apparent that a new consensus was required. The TRIPS Agreement was created as part 
of the GATT24. TRIPS takes the general standards of the Berne Convention and adds 
enforcement provisions. The TRIPS Agreement and other international conferences on 
copyright law have been marked by a divergence of interests between developed and 
developing nations.25
At a regional level the European Union has been active in attempting to harmonize the 
copyright laws of its member-states. Traditionally the continental Europeans, and in 
particular France, have followed the approach of author’s rights or droit moral.26 In 
contrast the approach in common law countries such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa has been that of balancing the 
interests between copyright owners and copyright users.
WIPO Copyright treaty
Formed in 1974 the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is one of the 16 
specialized agencies under the aegis of the United Nations. The mission of WIPO is “to 
promote through international cooperation the creation, dissemination, use, and 
protection of works of the human spirit for the economic, cultural and social progress of 
all mankind.”27 WIPO currently has 179 member states, including the United States, 
Australia and the vas majority of the European Union. One of the main goals of WIPO is 
to protect and promote the rights of the creators and owners of intellectual property.28 As 
WIPO states, the emphasis on the protection of the rights of creators and owners of 
intellectual property, “acts as a spur to human creativity, pushing forward the boundaries 
of science and technology and enriching the world of literature and the arts.”29 This focus 
on owners and creators is evident in the WIPO Copyright Treaty. The United States has 
24
 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994.
25
 Ibid note 17.
26
 Ibid note 1.
27 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), General Information, at http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/index.html?wipo_content_ frame=/about-wipo/en/gib.htm.
28
 Ibid.
29
 Ibid.
acceded to the treaty. However Australia, whilst substantially in compliance, has yet to 
formally accede to the treaty.
The WIPO Copyright Treaty specifically provides for the copyright protection of 
computer programs and data compilations.30 It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal 
substantively with the database debate. Article 11 deals with contracting parties 
obligations regarding technological protection measures. The WIPO Copyright treaty also 
recognizes the rights of authors by; (i) the right of distribution,31 (ii) the right of rental32
and (iii) the right of communication to the public.33
Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty provides for the obligations of nation-states 
with respect to technological measures. Article 11 states:
Contract Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and adequate legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise 
of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, 
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
The WIPO Copyright treaty is an attempt to update the main international copyright 
agreement, the Berne Convention, into the digital era.34 The WIPO Copyright Treaty is 
also extremely significant because it creates much of the international environment in 
which Australian and American copyright law now operates.
II. Australian Copyright Law
Copyright law in Australia is covered by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The Copyright 
Act covers two basic types of subject matter. The first are artistic, literary, musical and 
dramatics work.35 As in the United States computer programs are regarded as literary 
30
 Article 4 and Article 5.
31
 Article 6.
32
 Article 7.
33
 Article 8.
34
 See further the Preamble to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 1.
35
 Part III.
works.36 The second type of subject matter concerns broadcasts (sound and television), 
films, sound recording, performer’s rights and published editions of works.37 The 
Copyright Act is intended to cover the field of copyright law in Australia. Pursuant to the 
USFTAI Act copyright in works exists for the life of the author plus 70 years.38 The 
duration for copyright in sound recordings and cinematographic films is 70 years after the 
end of the calendar year of first publication.39 In order to qualify for copyright protection 
a work must be original, in material form and have some connection to Australia.40
As a statutory regime the Copyright Act applies to an extremely diverse range of subject 
matter. The range of works now protected by the Copyright Act has increased due to 
technological advances. In Australia the main Government body involved in policy 
review and research on copyright law has been the Copyright Law Review Committee. 
The Copyright Law Review Committee falls in part under the aegis of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General and the Attorney-General’s Department. 
In recent years a number of policy reviews have taken place and amending Acts to the 
Copyright Act have been passed. The Copyright (Computer Programs) Amendment Act 
1999 (Cth), the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) and the 
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Cth) have all modified the Copyright
Act. Chief amongst these has been the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000
otherwise known as the Digital Agenda Reform Act. The significance of the Digital 
Agenda Reform Act is that it was the main response of the Commonwealth Governm ent 
to the challenges facing Australian copyright law in the digital era.41 The USFTAI Act 
has built upon that response and has brought Australian copyright law closely into line 
with that of the United States.
36
 Section 10.
37
 Part IV. 
38
 Section 33.
39 Sections 93 and 94.
40
 Section 10. 
41 Phillips Fox (Law Firm), “Digital Agenda Review: Technology and Rights Issues Paper,” July 2003.
As part of its obligations under the AUSFTA Australia has acceded to the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty. This builds further upon the reforms of the Digital Reform Agenda Act 
which brought Australia into general compliance with emerging international standards. 
The Digital Agenda Reform Act was intended by Australia to implement its the standards
developed in the WIPO Copyright Treart. As such the Digital Agenda Reform Act 
reflected the need to protect owners of copyright from unfair and arbitrary interferences 
with their legal rights. Section 3 of the Digital Agenda Reform Act stated that the 
objective were to:
- ensure the efficient operation of relevant industries in the online environment by promoting the 
creation of copyright material and the exploitation of new online technologies by allowing 
financial reward for creators and investors; and
- promote certainty for industries that are investing in and providing online access to copyright 
material.
The Digital Agenda Reform Act made five key changes to the Copyright Act. Firstly the 
Act provided for a technologically neutral right of communication to the public.42 In 
essence this right was included to ensure that there was a broad right to make material 
available to the public online. However, as it was feared that if the right were expressed 
in particular technological terms, that the right might quickly become outdated it was 
decided to use a technology-neutral term.43 Secondly the Act extended exceptions to the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners to the digital environment.44
Thirdly anti-circumvention provisions were introduced.45 However the Australian anti-
circumvention provisions apply civil and criminal penalties only for making or 
commercially dealing in devices that are for the circumvention of technology protection 
measures.46 There are no provisions for the use of anti-circumvention devices, though 
under the AUSFTA Australia will need to implement tougher laws dealing with anti-
circumvention. Fourthly the Act introduced statutory licenses for the transmission of free 
42
 Section 31(1).
43 L. Gamertsfelder, “Digitising Copyright Law – An Australian Perspective,” 
6 Media & Arts Law Review 2001.
44
 Sections 103A-103C.
45
 Section 116A.
46
 Ibid.
to air broadcasts.47 Finally the Act limited and clarified the liability of carriers and 
carriage service providers for third party copyright infringements.48 Under the USFTAI 
Act Australia's laws in relation to carriage service providers now closely resemble those 
of the safe harbour provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Section 116A of the Copyright prohibits certain dealings in circumvention devices. It is 
the rough equivalent of section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act except that 
it does not explicitly proscribe the use of a circumvention device.49 Section 116A sets a 
three part test for liability. Firstly a work or subject matter must be protected by a 
technological protection device.50 Secondly, that a person makes available a 
circumvention device for use by others.51 With respect to this second requirement, section 
116A(1) lists six different ways in which a person may make an circumvention device 
available, such as by sale, exhibition, distribution, import, promotion or by making it 
available online.52 Thirdly a person must know, or ought reasonably to know, that the 
device would be used to circumvent, of facilitate the circumvention of a technological 
protection measure.53 With regard to the final element, the Copyright Act places the onus 
of proof upon the defendant to show that he or she did not have the requisite knowledge. 
The rights created by the Digital Agenda Reform Act can be utilized if a person applies a 
technological protection measure to that person’s work or subject matter. A 
‘technological protection measure’ is defined in the Copyright Act as:
A device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is designed, in the ordinary course of 
its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work or other subject matter by either 
or both of the following means:
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject matter is available solely by use of an access code 
or process (including decryption, unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject matter)
with the authority of the owner or licensee of the copyright;
47
 Section 135AL
48
 Section 22(6).
49
 Ibid note 42. See also S. McConnell, “The Napster case: which way would the balance of interests fall in 
Australia,” 6 Media & Arts Law Review 2001. 
50
 Section 116A(1)(c)
51
 Section 116A(1)(b)
52
 Ibid.
53
 Ibid note 49.
(b) through a copy control mechanism.54
A section 10(1) technological protection measure is one whereby the user cannot access 
the content unless they use a code or a key supplied by the owner. A copy control 
measure is any device employed by the owner that would prevent a person copying a 
digital product.55 At present this practice is widespread amongst content owners on the 
internet.
A ‘circumvention device’ is defined in section 10(1) as:
a device (including a computer program) having only a limited commercially significant purpose or use, 
other than the circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an effective technological protection 
measure.
The question of what constitutes a circumvention device is not definitively answered by 
section 10(1). Clearly a computer program devised to hack into a work qualifies as a 
circumvention device. One Australian lawyer stated:
The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘device’ as (amongst other things) ‘1) an invention or contrivance …. 2) 
a plan for effecting a purpose.’ Accordingly, any invention, plan or contrivance may fall within the 
definition of a circumvention device. This means that books, articles, teaching notes and the like could fall 
within the definition. This may be true even if the relevant text was a student text designed for a computer 
science course which assisted students to learn the finer points of cryptography or cryptoanalysis. As a 
circumvention device needs only to facilitate circumvention, this interpretation of the statute is certainly 
open.56
The broad scope of what constitutes a circumvention device is likely to be an attempt by 
Australian drafters to avoid choosing a technology-specific or narrow definition that 
would be likely to be outmoded by technological change. This approach to the statute is 
evident in the technology neutral right of broadcast to the public. However, by including 
the term ‘facilitating’ the test for whether a device qualifies as a circumvention device is 
possibly not stringent enough.57
54
 Section 10(1)
55
 Ibid.
56
 Ibid note 42 at p.15
57
 Ibid. 
The use of the phrase ‘limited commercially significant purpose’ is also problematic.58 If 
educational material such as a textbook, scholarly article or lecture notes are found to be 
of ‘commercially significant purpose’ then the Copyright Act would frustrate one of its 
own underlying objectives in the form of the dissemination of knowledge.59 However if 
educational material is outside the scope of the term then intuitively so too would be a 
book on hacking technology.60 In other words, provided a device has another independent 
commercial purpose then it would avoid the proscription of the Copyright Act.61 In 
attempting to account for the myriad of possibilities for copyright infringement in the 
digital environment the Australian Parliament has drafted legislation that is vulnerable to 
a number of constructions that would not serve its purposes.
The anti-circumvention provisions have been tested in Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer 
Entertainment v Stevens.62 In Sony the Full Federal Court the “mod-chipping” of Play 
Station consoles infringed section 116A.63 The defendant, Stevens, sold and installed 
modifying chips for consoles which allowed unauthorized copies of game CDs, and 
games from outside the regional coding, to be played on the consoles. This decision is 
likely to have an effect on DVD technology. To date sellers who sold technology 
designed to defeat regional coding for DVDs have not been caught by the copyright 
law.64 With regards to lawfully purchased game CDs and DVDs, Sony represents a 
further curtailment of user rights. If the content industry starts to target the sellers of 
technology that defeats regional coding then Australian consumers will face a situation 
where they may be forced to pay twice to access content that they have already legally 
purchased. Intuitively this is an unfair result for consumers and displays little evident 
incentives for creativity other than rent-seeking behavior with regards to distribution. To 
this extent the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has already 
58
 Ibid note 53.
59
 Ibid note 56.
60
 Ibid.
61
 Ibid.
62
 [2003]FCAFC 157. Recently also Australia’s first prosecution under the Digital Agenda Reform Act has 
commenced. See further L. Lamont, “Pirates face the music,” Sydney Morning Herald, 10 November 2003 
at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/11/10/1068329488834.html.
63
 Ibid.
64 Australian Financial Review, “US Can Trade on Sony’s Big Win,” Thursday, July 31, 2003.
expressed their disapproval of the decision, stating that, “consumers will suffer a loss of 
choice and pay more for their games.”65
Fair dealing
Fair dealing is one of the traditional safeguards for defendants in Australian copyright 
law.66 Sections 40-42 of the Copyright Act deal with fair dealing. Sections 40-42 provide 
that conduct that would otherwise be regarded as a breach of copyright is a fair dealing 
provided it is done for the purposes of research or study, criticism or review or reporting 
the news. The fair dealing exceptions are intended to remove copyright laws as a barrier 
to education, public discussion and he dissemination of information. The Copyright Law 
Review Committee considered the fair dealing exceptions during its Report on 
Simplification of the Copyright Act, Part 1: Exceptions to the Exclusive Rights of 
Copyright Owners. The Committee recommended:
• Consolidation of the current fair dealing provisions – ss. 40, 103C, 41, 103A, 42, 103B and 43(2) 
– in a single provision;
• Expansion of fair dealing to an open-ended model that specifically refers to the current exclusive 
set of purposes – research or study (ss. 40 and 103C), criticism or review (ss. 41 and 103A), 
reporting news (ss.42 and 103B) and professional advice (s. 43(2)) – but is not confined to these 
purposes;
• General application of the non-exclusive set of factors provided for in s. 40(2) to all fair 
dealings.67
The Committee was of the view that much of the complexity that currently surrounds the 
fair dealing provisions could be avoided by creating a single provision that would be 
“sufficiently flexible to accommodate the challenges posed by technological 
developments.”68 The Committee advanced two main criticisms of the current fair 
dealing provisions. Firstly the exceptions as they stand are not flexible enough because 
the attach only to specific uses and do not account for new uses which may arise as 
65
“Consumers Lose in Playstation Decision,” Media release of the ACCC 31 July 2003. 
http://www.accc.gov.au/media/mediar.htm
66
 See further W. Van Caenegem, Intellectual Property, Butterworths, Sydney, 2001.
67 Copyright Law Review Committee, Simplification of the Copyright Act, 1999 at Chapter 6 at part 6.10
68
 Ibid.
technology develops.69 Second, each new specific exception that is put into the Copyright 
Act increases the complexity of the legislation.70
The Committee intended that Australian copyright law adopt a position that would be 
more akin to the US fair use exception.71 Such a doctrine would have to be developed by 
the judiciary on a case by case basis as it has been in the United States. However the 
Committee’s proposal has yet to be adopted. The lack of flexibility in Australia’s fair 
dealing laws mean that it will be ill-equipped to safeguard socially desirable uses of 
copyright material in the future.
III. Copyright Law in the United States
The Constitution of the United States empowers the Congress to “promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”72 Copyright Law in the 
United States is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, which took effect on 1 January 
1978.73 The Copyright Act was the result of an arduous process of drafting and review 
that had gone on for more than twenty years.74 The Copyright Act continued the trend in 
the United States of providing more copyright protection to creative works. The Act 
broadened the scope of rights available to copyright owners and increased the term of 
copyright protection to the life of the author plus fifty years.75 Since its commencement 
in 1978 the Act has been amended twenty times.
69
 Ibid.
70
 Ibid.
71
 Ibid. See also J. McKeough, K. Bowery & P.Griffith, Intellectual Property: Commentary and Materials, 
Law Book Co., Sydney 2002. See alsoR.Reynolds & N. Stoianoff, Intellectual Property: Text and Essential 
Cases, Federation Press, Sydney, 2003. See also the Report of the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional affairs, “Cracking Down on Copycats: the enforcement of 
copyright in Australia,” 4 December 2000.
72
 U.S. Constitution art I, § 8, cl8.
73
 17 U.S.C.
74
 See further J. Litman, “Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,” 72 Cornell Law Review 857, 
879 (1987).
75
 This has been further extended to life plus 70 years by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. 
See further for the issue of duration I. Kilbey, “Copyright Duration? Too Long!” 2003 European 
Intellectual Property Review 105. See also J. Ginsburg, “Copyright Legislation for the "Digital 
Millennium,” 23 Columbia Journal of Law & Arts 137, 172 (1999). See generally, M. Hamilton, Copyright 
Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use has served as a traditional safeguard in American copyright law. 
The fair use provisions are contained in section 107 of the Copyright Act.76 Section 107 
sets out four factors that are used in determining whether the use of copyright materials 
constitutes fair use. These factors are: (i) the purpose and character of the use; (ii) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used; (iii) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
and (iv) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted 
work.77 Fair use is generally established by the courts on a case by case basis. The 
flexibility of the fair use doctrine is unique to the United States with most other 
jurisdictions having more limited exceptions to copyright owner’s rights.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The legislative amendments to the Copyright Act that have evoked the most controversy 
are the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.78 The laws of the United States were 
substantially in compliance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty before the DMCA was 
introduced.79 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) implemented the United 
States’ obligations under the WIPO Treaty and went further than those obligations under 
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655,(1996).
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Article 11.80 The DMCA prohibited circumvention of technological measures designed to 
control access to a copyrighted works.81 The DMCA prohibited circumvention of 
technological measures designed to protect a copyrighted work.82 The DMCA also 
prohibited the manufacture or distribution of circumvention devices.83 The DMCA 
provides some minor exceptions for such uses as encryption research,84 computer 
security,85 interoperability of computer products86 and personal privacy.87 Civil and 
criminal penalties apply for violations of the provisions of the DMCA. 
Criticisms of the DMCA
A number of academic commentators have made criticisms of the shortcomings of the 
DMCA.88 Under the DMCA a user cannot use a device to gain access or to circumvent 
control in order to make fair use of materials that would otherwise be inaccessible.89 In 
this sense the DMCA states that it is not intended to impede existing user rights but it 
provides no mechanism for the realization of those rights.90 The exceptions to the anti-
circumvention provisions do not cover the breadth of permitted exceptions under the fair 
use doctrine.91 Furthermore the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA effectively 
extend copyright protections to materials that were previously outside the scope of 
copyright.92 For example facts and useful ideas may be interspersed with copyright 
material, but as they cannot be accessed or copied under the DMCA, they are effectively 
granted de facto copyright protection.
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The DMCA also has the potential to make even very trivial uses of technology into 
criminal acts. As one commentator noted a violation of the anti-circumvention provisions 
of the DMCA could be effected simply by applying a felt tip marker to a copy-protected 
CD in order to play the CD on a computer.93
True or false: A person can commit a federal crime in the United States with only a compact disc (CD) and 
a felt-tip marker purchased legally at Wal- Mart. Not long ago, the answer would have been false, but two 
important things have happened to make the scenario much more plausible. First, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) was signed into U.S. law in 1998. Among other things, the DMCA makes it illegal 
to circumvent technological measures employed by copyright owners in the protection of their copyrighted 
materials. Second, copyright owners have begun to use very innovative technologies, such as the copy-
protected music CD, to protect their copyrighted materials. 
By changing the location of data on compact discs, music recording companies hoped to prevent their discs 
from being readable by computers and, in turn, to prevent the data from being copied onto computer hard 
drives and then limitlessly distributed. Once the so-called copy-protected music CDs hit the market, 
however, crafty consumers discovered that CD copy protection technologies … could easily be foiled by 
covering over a section of the disc with a mark from a common felt-tip marker. … If using a felt tip marker 
to get around the protection amounts to "circumvention of any measure that effectively controls access to a 
copyrighted work," then a person commits a federal crime by doing so. Therefore, under the DMCA, a 
person might be able to commit a federal crime in the United States by applying a felt-tip marker to a CD.94
A law that can so easily be violated, and enforces such draconian penalties, cannot really 
be good for society. This was illustrated in the case of Professor Felten and the Secure 
Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).95 SDMI developed encryption technology to limit the 
use of certain files with a digital watermark. SDMI announced publicly a challenge for 
anyone who could remove the digital watermark, offering a $10,000 reward. Professor 
Felten of Princeton and his team successfully circumvented most of the encryption 
technologies and prepared a paper on their work. As Professor Felten and his colleagues 
were preparing to present the paper at a conference he received a letter from the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) warning that public disclosure of the 
paper might subject him to action under the DMCA. Fearing that the release of the paper 
would undermine all their investment in the encryption technologies SDMI had sought to 
prevent Professor Felten’s research from becoming public. In the ensuing public furore 
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SDMI and the RIAA backtracked and guaranteed Professor Felten and his colleagues that 
they would not sue.
In the case of Russian software programmer, Dimitri Sklyarov, he was jailed under the 
provisions of the DMCA.96 Sklyarov had prepared a copyright circumventing program in 
Russia for his employer, ElcomSoft. At the time that Sklyarov wrote the program it was 
perfectly legal in Russia. He was arrested in the United States whilst in Las Vegas to 
speak at a conference on digital security mechanisms. His arrest sparked more adverse 
publicity for the DMCA. Ultimately he was released from prison in exchange for 
testifying against his employer.
Both the cases of Professor Felten and Dimitri Skylarov indicate the potential for the 
DMCA to be used to serve commercial interests and to frustrate the research and the 
pursuit of knowledge. These are the draconian aspects of the DMCA that have raised the 
ire of academic commentators and internet lobbyists. The potential for the DMCA to be 
used to serve existing commercial interests and to stifle knowledge is a significant public 
policy issue.97
IV. Digital Rights Management
The rapid advancements in technology have created much market opportunities for the 
various information industries. However, as noted above, there has also been a 
corresponding increase in information piracy. In order to counter this threat there has 
been an increase in digital rights management.98 Basically digital rights management is 
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the employment of technological tools that create increased levels of protection for works 
in the digital environment.99 These tools can operate in a variety of ways but the main 
goals are to prevent access, monitor access or limit the use, reproduction and 
manipulation of works in a digital format.100 The underlying goal is to raise the cost of 
engaging in the unauthorized use of a copyright protected work above the benefits of that 
use. 
An example of a digital rights management tool is a virtual container. A virtual container
contains protected material that the user can only access if he or she agrees to the terms 
and conditions set by the owner.101 The agreement is likely to take the form of a license 
or contract. Typically these agreements are not negotiated and the user has only the 
options of agreeing to the terms and conditions or disagreeing and thereby forfeiting use 
of the content.102 Other forms of digital rights management tools are encryption 
technologies and watermarks.103 Encryption technologies convert information into a 
digital code. The information can only be accessed if the user has a key or a password. 
Watermarks contain data and are part of the protected work. Watermarks allow owners to 
track the use of their works. 
Digital rights management tools are also able to collect payments from users in exchange 
for access to materials on the internet.104 These digital rights management tools are able 
to equip the owners of material with the ability to price discriminate against 
consumers.105 That is, for a small payment the user may get the right to view the 
document once. For a slightly higher payment the user may get the right to view the 
material several times and for a much larger payment the user may get the right to make 
99
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copies.106 In this way the digital management tools can supplant existing user freedoms in 
a way not currently envisaged by copyright laws. Indeed digital rights management tools 
may bring about the emergence of “fared use” in copyright. The concept of “fared use” 
was discussed by Professor Bell:
At its most powerful, ARM (Automated rights management) supports the “superdistribution” of proprietary 
information. In other words, it allows information providers to market documents that disallow certain 
types of uses (e.g., copying) and provide continuing revenue (e.g., charging 2 cents per access) regardless 
of who holds the document (e.g., including someone who obtained it post-first sale). Superdistribution thus 
offers information providers a rather daunting compendium of powers. In practice … no ARM system can 
guarantee absolute control over information, especially after it escapes digital media …. Even if only 
partially effective … ARM will radically improve the efficiency of licensing practices in the digital 
intermedia. Consequently, it will have a radical impact on the fair use doctrine.107
The implications for fair use and fair dealing are apparent in the rise of digital rights 
management tools.108 The notion of “fared use,” as opposed to fair use, has significant 
consequences for user rights in the real world. It illustrates the potential for digital rights 
management tools to shift the balance between users and owners strongly in favor of the 
latter. 
There is nothing in either the DMCA or the Digital Agenda Reform Act to indicate that 
either the parliaments of Australia or the United States have considered this possibility in 
much depth. In fact the decision of the Australian Parliament to not adopt the flexible fair 
dealing provision advocated by the Copyright Law Review Committee puts Australia at a 
distinct disadvantage in this area.
V. Can the Balance be Restored?
Protecting copyright in the digital era is driven by the concerns of industry, international 
agreements and pressure from other jurisdictions. As the process of globalization 
continues it is inevitable that there will be a concerted effort to harmonize laws on 
copyright. It would be difficult to maintain an increasingly global market for information 
in an environment where the laws vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
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The similarities between Australian and American copyright laws are reflective of these 
pressures. However there are compelling reasons to avoid moving too far in one 
direction. The legal changes to date have strongly favored the owners of copyright. The 
balance of interests between users and owners is intuitively appealing. Even within the 
civil law legal system, whose traditions mostly honor the moral rights of author’s there 
has been some deference to the public interest.109
The first step would be too openly acknowledge that the balance of interests between the 
users and owners of copyright is in a state of disequilibrium. In an analysis of copyright 
law in cyberspace, Professor Trotter Hardy identified four inter-related factors that 
assured copyright owners that any copying of their works would be limited.110 The 
factors identified by Professor Hardy were: (i) entitlement like protection in the form of 
copyright laws, (ii) contract-like protection; (iii) state-of-the-art limitations in the form of 
technological limitations on how much copying can take place; and (iv) special purpose 
technical limitations in the form of technological devices to specifically limit copying.111
Professor Hardy’s hypothesis was that a change in one factor leads to changes in the 
other factors:
It is helpful to think of this four-part “aggregate assurance” of limited copying in the form of a pie chart. 
One slice of the “pie” represents the limitations inhering in the ‘state-of-the-copying-art,” another 
represents “entitlement-like” protection, and so on. The overall size of the pie – the sum of all four factors -
is what matters to information producers, because the overall size determines how limited the unauthorized 
copying of their product will be. ….. The taxonomy implies that if one of the “slices” of the pie grows or 
shrinks, other slices must shrink or grow proportionally if the producer is to preserve the same overall 
assurance of limited copying.112
Another way of examining this is to see how Professor Hardy’s copyright “pie” affects 
the balance of interests between copyright users and owners. If we assume that prior to 
the digital revolution these four factors existed at their relative levels and provided some 
degree of equilibrium between the interests of owners and users. Then the advent of the 
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digital era, with the ease of copying, created a state of disequilibrium between owners 
and users. This disequilibrium was brought about by a change in Hardy’s third factor that 
favored the users. Consequently the owners of copyright sought to readjust the factors, as 
is consistent with Professor Hardy’s analysis.113 The copyright owners changed their 
legal entitlements, wrote new contracts and sought special purpose technological 
limitations on copying in the form of DRMS. In short in response to a change in 
technology that enabled more copying, the owners changed the other three factors. The 
result is not that the state of copyright reverts to the equilibrium that it was in prior to the 
digital era. The result is that the copyright has reached a new state of existence with a 
disequilibrium in favor of the owners. 
In part this has occurred because governments have been quick to find ways to protect 
economic interests. For example, the limitation on internet liability in the Digital Agenda 
Reform Act represented a reversal of the verdict of the Australian High Court in Telstra v 
APRA.114 In Telstra v APRA the High Court found Telstra to be liable for the transmission 
of copyright infringing material on its system. Telstra is Australia’s largest 
telecommunications service provider and the decision would have had significant 
implications for its business. The Australian Government moved quickly and correctly to 
safeguard the interests of internet service providers by modifying the copyright law, and 
thus denying some of the interests of copyright owners, so that internet services in 
Australia could run smoothly.115 Arguably this was a correct decision but it is indicative 
of the focus on economic rights and interests. 
The social concerns that have underpinned common law copyright should not be 
marginalized. Indeed it is implicit in Locke’s consideration of man and property in Two 
Treatises on Government that social obligations arise out of the creation of property.116
That is, the creators of property have the right to adequate reward but there is also an 
obligation to share some of the fruits of their labors with others provided that there is 
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sufficient supply. This notion is further strengthened by the concept of the intellectual 
commons. As the creators of intellectual property invariably draw from the intellectual 
commons in making their works they also have a duty to assist in maintaining and 
enriching the commons.117
The way that owner’s rights are broadening towards becoming control rights represents a 
diminishment of the intellectual commons. The way in which the American fair use 
doctrine is limited by the anti-circumvention laws, and the failure of the Australian fair 
dealing laws to be adequately adapted to the changing situation, are a part of the wider 
limitations on user rights. As a result copyright is heading towards become a personal 
property right. This is something not envisaged in the United States Constitution or ever 
contemplated by American or Australian legislators.
The notion of “fared use” brings with it the very real prospect of a real digital divide 
occurring within nations. The concept of fair use as market failure does not account for 
the capacity to pay of each individual consumer. It simply derives from the notion that 
the market cannot find a suitable way for the copyright owner to be compensated. Those 
users who cannot afford the cost of “fared use” will be denied access to information that 
they otherwise would have received under the fair use doctrine or fair dealing. 
There is a legitimate need for copyright protection in the digital era. However the way in 
which that copyright protection is achieved need not be by recourse to draconian laws. It 
is possible that a campaign of educating consumers about the reasons and virtues of 
respecting copyright might prove successful. Anthropologist Michael Brown examined a 
variety of issues and case-studies relating to culture and intellectual property.118 In one 
case study Native American groups at Devil’s Tower in Wyoming found themselves in
conflict with the rock climbers and campers with regard to the use of Devil’s Tower for 
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religious ceremonies.119 Public discussion and debate on the issue resulted in the 
authorities responsible for the national park containing Devil’s Tower to issue a general 
request to the public to avoid using the Tower in June, when the Native American groups 
held there most significant religious ceremonies. By and large the request was 
observed.120 Once the issues had been properly explained to the public a culture of 
compliance developed.
There is no reason why a similar degree of cooperation cannot exist with respect of 
copyright in Australia and the United States. Education and awareness could challenge 
the notion that copyright infringement is a victimless crime. It could also reinforce with 
the public the reasons why copyright law exists in the first place. 
VI. Conclusion
The US Constitution contains the best rationale for the protection of copyright. That is, 
progress in the form of the advancement of science and the useful arts. It is intuitive that 
for any society to function and flourish that there must be a relatively free-flow of 
information and ideas. This does not mean that the flow of information should be so free 
so as to not recognize the legitimate interests of authors and thereby to create a 
disincentive for creativity. What it means is that copyright law must be a constant 
balancing act, a negotiation and a renegotiation, of the protections for copyright owners 
and the interests of copyright users. The public has a dual interest in balancing the rights 
of owners and users. The public good is best served by a model of copyright law where 
there is a high level of access to information as well as a great degree of incentive to 
create.
The challenge facing policy- makers is that in the midst of the information revolution 
maintaining the balance between increasingly activist owners of copyright rights and the 
interests of users is not a task for which there are easy answers. However the logic that 
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has defined the common law approach to copyright cannot so easily be discarded. It is 
imperative that the United States and Australian Governments find a way to restore the 
balance, even if it means engaging in a constant process of adjusting copyright laws to 
cope with a changing technological environment. The purpose of copyright law is to 
provide incentives for creativity whilst maintaining the public interest in access to 
information. It is not appropriate for copyright law to be co-opted to serve the interests of 
established businesses and to entrench their market power.
